



Radiation Validation for the CMS HCAL Front-End Electronics

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Abstract

Over a 10 year operating period, the CMS Hadron Calorimeter (HCAL) detector will be exposed to radiation fields of approximately 1 kRad of total ionizing dose (TID) and a neutron fluence of 4E11 n/cm². All front-end electronics must be qualified to survive this radiation environment with no degradation in performance. In addition, digital components in this environment can experience single-event upset (SEU) and single-event latch-up (SEL). A measurement of these single-event effects (SEE) for all components is necessary in order to understand the level that will be encountered. Radiation effects in all electronic components of the HCAL front-end system have been studied. Results from these studies will be presented.

dose of 330 rads and a neutron flux of 1.3E11 n/cm² [1]. Since these estimates have uncertainties on the order of a factor of three and do not include any safety factor, the total dose studies performed probed fluences of 5E11 n/cm² and over 1 kRad. High energy neutrons that interact in the silicon are expected to produce an SEE such as SEU or SEL. An SEU is defined as a non-destructive event that causes a flip-flop to change state. An SEL is a potentially catastrophic event resulting from triggering a silicon controlled rectifier (SCR) formed from the parasitics of the bulk silicon.

The HCAL detector [2] is a sampling calorimeter of brass absorber and scintillating tile with embedded fiber readout. The front-end electronics chain is shown in Figure 1. Hybrid photo-diodes (HPD) [3] convert light into current that is presented to a dead timeless integrating ADC (the QIE – Charge Integrating and Encoding ASIC) [4] running at 40 MHz. The CCA (Channel Control ASIC) [5] provides clocks to the QIE and synchronizes and monitors data from multiple QIEs. The GOL (Gigabit Optical Link) performs a parallel-to-serial conversion and drives the data to a commercial Vertical Cavity Surface Emitting Laser (VCSEL). The data is then optically transmitted out of the radiation area at 1.6 Gbps to the HCAL trigger and readout boards.

I. THE CMS HCAL RADIATION ENVIRONMENT

The CMS experiment is scheduled to run for 10 years. During this period, some detector elements will be irradiated with a total ionizing dose (TID) of over 10 MRad and a neutron fluence of over 1E15 n/cm². However, the HCAL detector will see a much smaller dose. The highest doses that sections of the HCAL detector will see are a total ionizing




Figure 1: HCAL Front-End Electronics Schematic. TX represents the Gigabit Optical Link and the VCSEL.




Figure 2: HCAL Six Channel Front-End P.C. Board

A picture of a prototype 6-channel front-end board is shown in Figure 2. The major components of the 6-channel board are (from left to right) six QIEs, three CCAs, two GOL transmitters, two low voltage regulators, and two VCSELS (mounted on the back side of the board). In addition to the front-end boards, Clock Control Monitoring (CCM) modules distribute clocks to the front-end boards, monitor temperatures and low voltages, and provide slow control communication paths for downloading control registers. Also

in the radiation zone are calibration modules that provide monitoring of the front-end electronics path via radioactive source, LED, or laser injection inputs.

The QIE is fabricated in the Austria Micro Systems (AMS) 0.8 μm BiCMOS process. The CCA is fabricated in the Agilent (formerly HP) 0.5 μm micron bulk-CMOS process. The QIE has bipolar and MOS transistors, while the CCA uses only MOS. Bipolar transistors in the AMS process have been studied previously [6], and circuits have been proven tolerant up to an ionizing dose of ~ 10 MRad. The effects from displacement damage are explored in the studies reported here. SEU susceptibility has been investigated with test shift registers for both the AMS and Agilent processes. Four different flip-flop cell layouts were studied for each process. Results are presented in Section III.

Radiation effects on other major components of this system also have been investigated. Some components, like the GOL and the low voltage regulators, have been developed in radiation hard processes [7,8]. The VCSEL has been tested by the manufacturer to much higher radiation levels than will be seen by HCAL, but with a different packaging; we have studied the VCSEL in the final packaging that will be used in the HCAL system. Single-event Burnout (SEB) was studied for the HPD. Commercial front-end components (FPGAs, PECL clocking chips, transceivers, Analog MUX, temperature sensors, LEDs, VCSELs) were studied for SEE. Components with acceptable SEU levels and limited SEL susceptibility have been selected.

II. RADIATION FACILITY AND PROCEDURE

Most of the radiation effects studies reported here were done using the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility (IUCF) 200 MeV proton cyclotron in Bloomington, Indiana. The correlation for bulk damage induced protons at fixed energy and that for the predicted neutron spectrum at the location of the electronics has been calculated [1] for a variety of proton energies. The high-energy proton beam at IUCF was selected as opposed to the more common 60 MeV facilities for several reasons:

- TID is a factor of 2.3 lower per proton allowing higher fluences per test device.
- Linear energy transfers up to 25 MeV-cm²/mg are reached.
- Ten percent of the interactions have linear energy transfers above 8 MeV-cm²/mg [9].
- Fission reactions are possible with impurity and dopant species, and can trigger a destructive SEL.

Since typical linear energy transfer figures for the CMS environment are less than 15 MeV-cm²/mg [10], a device that is insensitive to latch-up in a 200 MeV beam is expected to be immune to latch-up in the CMS environment. Radiation effects studies of low voltage DC-DC converters at 60, 200, and 300 MeV were performed at Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, IUCF, and Paul Scherrer Institute, Switzerland, respectively.

Devices under test (DUT) were placed at the end of the beam line and were illuminated with a 7 cm diameter beam spot. Approximately 25 feet away and behind a shielding wall was the test station that provided power to the devices, registered the data, reset the devices, and power cycled the DUT if an SEL was sensed. A PC that recorded the SEU errors and the number of SEL resets resided in the counting house, approximately 75 feet from the test stand. A full description of the test stand and the IUCF facility can be found in references [11] and [12].

Irradiations were done in two steps where the first step took all devices to the full 10 year dose equivalent to assess bulk damage issues. Subsequently, the devices were further irradiated to much higher levels to determine SEU and SEL probabilities with adequate statistics. The SEE probabilities were assessed using the number of SEE occurrences per proton times the neutron equivalency factor for the predicted energy spectrum. Since SEU and SEL have markedly different consequences, that is one spurious data word versus loss of a significant number of channels, the number of devices in the customary formula [# SEE/fluence \times (1E11 n/cm²/10yr) \times # devices] is interpreted quite differently in these two cases. Trigger rates are the main concern for SEU occurrences but only on a 100 microsecond scale because the entire front-end electronics system is reset every orbit period of the accelerator and any digital SEU error is cleared. For SEU, the number of devices is then equal to the number of channels. By contrast, an SEL event could paralyze a system board and its 144 channels making the number of channels affected two orders of magnitude higher. Thus, radiation testing must take the system boards to much higher irradiation levels corresponding to this increased vulnerability. Practical considerations intervened during the exposures as the level of activation of the test boards became very high, and the present measurements reported here set a limit of less than one radiation induced failure per 4 year interval. It is important to note that during the SEL enhanced dosing, devices that were sensitive to the TID effect from using a proton beam would stop operating, but continued irradiation and monitoring for latch-up was valid since SEL is a phenomenon only of the bulk silicon.

III. AGILENT AND AMS STUDIES

Shift registers of several different transistor sizes and configurations were produced in both the Agilent 0.5 μm bulk-CMOS and AMS 0.8 μm BiCMOS processes for these radiation studies. Three to four shift registers per chip were operated simultaneously at 40 MHz while beam was incident on the device. Data were down loaded at the beginning of the run. Data from the register outputs were then fed back through the inputs, clocking through the registers at 40 MHz. The registers were read out once every 15 seconds, and the data pattern was refreshed after every reading. The data and the tally of the number of SEUs per register were logged to a file after each reading.

The proton beam intensity was selected so that a statistically significant number of single event upsets could be

observed. The beam was tuned for the Agilent and AMS shift registers individually, slowly increasing the intensity until one to two SEUs were observed per minute of beam incident on the device. The optimal running condition for both processes was determined to be $\sim 6E9$ p/cm²/sec. Most runs lasted ~ 20 minutes and reached a fluence of $6.4E12$ p/cm² and a total ionizing dose of 390 kRad.

Devices were tested at nominal operating temperature by surrounding the device with resistors, which were used as heaters. For the HCAL environment, the nominal operating temperature is estimated to be $\sim 45^\circ$ C.

The three shift registers on the Agilent chip each have a chain of 256 D flip-flops connected in a cascade, three clock drivers, and three output drivers. The first design contains minimum size ($0.5 \mu\text{m}$) devices, the second contains

minimum size transistors with a guard ring, and the third has the transistors scaled by a factor of two with a guard ring added. The Agilent chips operate with a 3.3V power supply.

Data were taken with several Agilent chips under varying conditions. Runs were taken with the beam normal to the back of the chip, at an 80° angle with respect to the normal, at a 45° angle, and at a 180° angle. An alternating pattern of 0s and 1s were clocked into the registers for most runs. A separate run was taken in which the data pattern was all 0s or all 1s. The cross section for the device was calculated by taking the total number of errors divided by the number of flip-flops times the fluence. It is effectively the probability of getting an upset per flip-flop per n/cm². A summary of the run conditions, the fluence, the number of errors and the cross sections for the Agilent devices is shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Results for Agilent SEU studies. SEU cross-section is calculated by # SEE/fluence (n/cm²).

Dev. No.	Beam Angle	Bit Patt.	TID (kRad)	Fluence (p/cm ²)	Reg. No.	0 \Rightarrow 1	1 \Rightarrow 0	Total Error	X-Sec (cm ²)
1	0	Alt	391	6.44E12	1	42	8	50	0.305E-13
					2	28	3	31	0.189E-13
					3	7	0	7	0.427E-14
3	0	Alt	391	6.44E12	1	43	6	49	0.299E-13
					2	33	8	41	0.250E-13
					3	4	0	4	0.244E-14
5	80	Alt	195	3.2E12	1	25	10	35	0.427E-13
					2	19	1	20	0.244E-13
					3	10	0	10	0.122E-13
5	45	Alt	195	3.2E12	1	30	6	36	0.439E-13
					2	20	1	21	0.256E-13
					3	5	0	5	0.610E-14
2	0	0s	195	3.2E12	1	33	0	33	0.403E-13
					2	19	0	19	0.232E-13
					3	2	0	2	0.244E-14
2	0	1s	195	3.2E12	1	0	4	4	0.488E-14
					2	0	2	2	0.244E-14
					3	0	0	0	<0.122E-14
4	180	Alt	391	6.4E12	1	49	5	54	0.330E-13
					2	28	8	36	0.220E-13
					3	Not a functioning register			

One effect observed was that more upsets occurred in registers with the minimum size transistors than in the register with the larger transistors, when the beam was normal to the chips. There were also fewer upsets for the register that had minimum feature size with guard rings than the one without. As expected, SEU errors of a 0 changing to a 1 occurred more frequently than a 1 changing to a 0. Register 3, which has twice minimum size transistors plus the guard ring, was least sensitive to upsets. However, register 3 was more sensitive to beam angle. This could be the case if the oxide layer were thin, so that there is a large increase in the sensitive volume which a particle passes through when the beam is directed nearly parallel to the face of the chip (as is the case with the 80° run). No latch-ups occurred for any of the registers.

The AMS chip had four shift registers. The first three contained a chain of 256 D flip-flops connected in a cascade. The last register was comprised of a chain of 65 D flip-flops connected in a cascade. There were four clock drivers and

four output drivers. The first register had minimum size transistors ($0.8 \mu\text{m}$), the second had minimum size plus guard rings, and the third had transistors scaled by a factor of two with guard rings. In the fourth case, an SEU tolerant flip-flop was created. The register contained a chain of 65 D flip-flops. The power rail for the AMS chip was 5.0V.

Runs similar to ones taken for the Agilent device were performed. However, the run in which a pattern of all 1s or all 0s was clocked into the device was not carried out because of the limited number of parts available. Shift registers 1 and 2, i.e. the ones with minimum size transistors, failed due to TID during the run. Consequently, the errors, the TID, and fluence listed in the table for these registers are the doses delivered at the time that these registers failed. SEUs in these two registers were also difficult to determine because the number of SEUs per reading increased due to the threshold shifts in the chip. In order to avoid biasing the cross-section measurement, a maximum SEU cutoff is set at 5 events per

reading. This effectively removes the data in which the register is failing from TID. Tests results are summarized in Table 2.

No upsets were ever seen in Register 4, the SEU tolerant register. Register 3, with two times minimum transistor size, is less susceptible to upsets than Registers 1 and 2, which had minimum transistor size. Because registers 1 and 2 failed during the runs in which the beam angle changed to 80° and 45°, it is harder to draw a conclusion about the sensitivity of the smaller transistors to increased beam angle. However, it is apparent that Register 3 is more likely to upset with the

beam nearly parallel to the chip. There were no latch-ups for any of the registers.

A follow-up study was conducted on the AMS chips in order to verify that the failure of the first two registers was due to ionizing radiation. Chips were tested upon return to Fermilab, after ~6 weeks annealing time. Registers 1 and 2 still did not operate. Two of the chips were then subjected to accelerated annealing at 100° C for 154 hrs. This corresponds to ~8 years at room temperature. After annealing, the registers now work, indicating that the failure was due to total ionizing radiation and not displacement damage.

Table 2: Results for AMS SEU studies.

Dev. No.	Beam Angle	Bit Patt.	TID (kRad)	Fluence (p/cm ²)	Reg. No.	0⇒1	1⇒0	Total Error	X-Sec (cm ²)
4	0	Alt	261	4.30E12	1	64	6	70	0.636E-13
			239	3.94E12	2	43	1	44	0.436E-13
			391	6.44E12	3	2	0	2	0.121E-14
			391	6.44E12	4	0	0	0	<0.243E-14
6	0	Alt	243	4.00E12	1	68	5	73	0.713E-13
			233	3.84E12	2	42	2	44	0.448E-13
			391	6.44E12	3	1	0	1	0.610E-15
			391	6.44E12	4	0	0	0	<0.244E-14
7	80	Alt	194	3.20E12	1	54	14	68	0.830E-13
			184	3.02E12	2	43	3	46	0.595E-13
			194	3.20E12	3	6	0	6	0.732E-14
			194	3.20E12	4	0	0	0	<0.488E-14
7	45	Alt	20	3.20E12	1	11	3	14	0.116E-12
					2	Dead			
			194	3.20E12	3	3	0	3	0.366E-14
			194	3.20E12	4	0	0	0	<0.488E-14
2	180	Alt	218	3.59E12	1	38	4	42	0.457E-13
			203	3.34E12	2	41	5	46	0.538E-13
			391	6.40E12	3	1	0	1	0.610E-15
					4	Not a functioning register			

A test was conducted to measure the effect of displacement damage on bipolar transistors from the AMS 0.8 μm BiCMOS process. The beta of the two NPN transistors on a chip, one minimum size (3 μm X 0.8 μm) the other larger (29 μm X 0.8 μm), were measured before irradiation. The transistors were not biased during irradiation. The device was put into the 200 MeV proton beam for a total exposure of 5E11 p/cm², corresponding to ~3 kRad ionizing radiation. The betas of the two transistors were re-measured six weeks after exposure. Beta at the operating point of the device, roughly ~10 μA, decreased by 8.6% for the smaller transistor and 11.1% for the larger transistor. Figure 3 shows a plot of beta versus operating current for the minimum size transistor before and after irradiation. The chip was then subjected to accelerated annealing at 100° C and 168 hrs. Beta increased by 2% for the small transistor and 3.4% for the large transistor.

IV. HPD STUDIES

Studies in which HPDs underwent low energy neutron irradiation to the level that will be seen by the HCAL have been reported on previously [13]. An additional concern was

the possibility of single event burnout events (SEB) that could potentially destroy an HPD. These events could occur if a high energy neutron produces a large energy transfer within the HPD silicon near the high field region of the HPD. In these studies, an HPD was placed in a 200 MeV proton beam and irradiated to the 10 year equivalent exposure for HCAL (~2E11 p/cm²). The HPD bias voltage was varied between 100V, 150V, and 200V. No dependence on voltage was seen, with no indication of avalanche events. The increase in leakage current was consistent with the previous neutron studies. Details of the SEB study are reported in [14].

V. COMMERCIAL PARTS

The Actel A54SX72A FPGA will be used to download information via the slow data path. For the purposes of this test, the device was configured as a 256-bit shift register similar to the AMS-Agilent studies. During irradiation, these devices were monitored for SEU and SEL. These FPGAs are bipolar parts that are sensitive to TID. Consequently, the devices stopped functioning after ~150 kRad. The chips were irradiated further, to set an SEL limit of less than 1 Clock Control Module (CCM) board failure per 4 years of operation.

SEUs were seen at an acceptable level of 1 SEU per board per week. No SELs were seen, but current draw for a device increased roughly 50-75% after the device stopped functioning. The Philips I2C transceiver (P82B96) was also tested. This part was irradiated to a level that allowed a limit to be set of less than 1 SEL per 4 years of operation. This device was also sensitive to TID and stopped reading back at ~50 kRad, so the SEU data collected were not usable. However, because of the logic levels of the P82B96, we plan to replace the device with the 82B715 Bus Extender. The 82B715 will be tested in October 2002.




Figure 3: Beta versus operating current for a minimum size NPN transistor before (top) and after (bottom) irradiation.

An earlier study of clocking devices showed BLVDS chips (National MCDS92LV090A and DS92CK16) were sensitive to SEL. PECL chips, however, were insensitive to irradiation and have been selected for the HCAL front-end boards. All devices were operated at 40 MHz during irradiation. Clock glitches were monitored with a high-speed scope. Latch-up was monitored with automatic power cycling of the chip if over-current was sensed. Several different Motorola clock chips were studied: MC100LVEP111 (differential PECL clock driver), MC100LVELT23 (dual differential LVPECL-LVTTL), and the MC100LVELT22 (dual differential LVTTL-LVPECL). Chips were irradiated to a level that set limits of less than 1 failure per 4 year operating period for either a 6-channel board or a CCM module.

Low voltage Vicor DC-DC converters (V375B5C200A, V375B12C250A, V300B12C250AL, V300B5C200A) were studied for radiation tolerance against destructive SEB. Parts were irradiated up to $2E11$ p/cm² with protons of 60 MeV, 200 MeV, and 300 MeV protons. SEB induced failures were seen for V375B5200A and V300B12C250AL, although all converters appeared to perform well up to fluences of 1.0-3.0E11 p/cm² if the input voltage, V_{ds} , were in the range of 255-300V. All converters operated without failure to the nominal neutron fluence when de-rating the input voltage and output voltages. Results are presented in [15].

Honeywell HFE419x-521 VCSELs have been selected for the HCAL readout system. Honeywell VCSELs with the same glass have been irradiated to more than 100 MRads with less than 14% degradation for chip and glass combined. The pill-pack version of the HFE419x-521 also has been irradiated to more than 10 MRads with no darkening observed [16]. In our studies, several VCSELs were exposed to 200 MeV protons at IUCF with $5E11$ p/cm² (~8 kRad). Data transmission integrity after dosing was tested at 1.6 Gbps operation. No bit errors were observed, lending additional confidence that these devices will be robust in the HCAL radiation environment.

Other support components such as the Analog Devices ADG706 analog MUX were tested. No latch-ups were seen. A limit of less than 1 CCM failure per 4 year operating period was achieved. SEUs were observed, but since this device will be used in slow control, the rate was determined to be at a tolerable level. Two different types of LEDs were studied. A blue Toshiba (25-365C) and a green Nichia (NSPG500S) LED were irradiated to the 10 year dose equivalent. Since these calibration LEDs will be monitored with PIN-diodes, the critical factor is that a large drop in light level does not occur. No significant change in light level was observed.

VI. SUMMARY

Nearly all HCAL front-end electronics components have been radiation proven to operate up to the HCAL radiation levels of $4E11$ n/cm² and 1 kRad. Additional studies of destructive events such as SEL have shown that chosen devices are immune to SEL during a 4 year operating period. A more stringent specification requiring no SEL over 10 years of operation was difficult to achieve because of limited beam time and the resulting activation of the test boards. Test registers developed in the Agilent and AMS processes that will be used for the QIE and CCA ASICs were exposed to a 200 MeV proton beam. AMS NPN bipolar transistors were dosed to $5E11$ n/cm² equivalent; a 5-10% drop in the beta of the transistors was seen with no degradation in performance. For a conservative design of twice the minimum feature size and guard ring, SEU cross-sections of $(1-10)E-15$ SEU per n/cm² per cell were measured, corresponding to an SEU rate of 0.1-0.01 SEU/chip/year for a complex layout of 1000 cells. An SEU tolerant cell design [17] was implemented and is expected to yield an even lower SEU rate. For the commercial devices, limits have been set of less than 1 SEL per 6-channel (or CCM) board per 4 years. Vicor DC-DC converters can be made radiation tolerant to the CMS

environment by de-rating the input and output voltages. No indication of avalanche events in HPDs was seen. Commercial support components for the front-end board have been irradiated and radiation tolerant devices have been selected. Irradiation studies on production layout front-end boards will be conducted in late autumn 2002.

VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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